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ISSN 0924-7815 A note on permutationally convex games
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Abstract
In this paper we generalise marginal vectors and permutational convexity. We show that if a
game is generalised permutationally convex, then the corresponding generalised marginal vector
is a core element. Furthermore we rene the concept of permutational convexity and show that
this renement yields a sucient condition for the corresponding marginal vector to be a core
element. Finally, we prove that permutational convexity is equivalent to a restricted set of
inequalities and that if a game is permutationally convex with respect to an order, then it is
permutationally convex with respect to a related order as well.
JEL Classication: C71
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1 Introduction
Permutational convexity (concavity) was rst introduced in [2]. In that paper it is shown that
permutational convexity yields a sucient condition for a corresponding marginal vector to be a
core element. By applying this result to minimum cost spanning tree games, it is shown that
specic marginal vectors are core elements.
The approach of [2] is adopted by, e.g., [1], [3], [4] and [5]. In [1] the permutational convexity of
minimum cost spanning forest games is shown, and in [3] the non-emptiness of the core of holding
cost games is shown with the use of permutational concavity. The existence of core elements for
two types of sequencing games is shown in [4] and [5] with the aid of permutational convexity.
In this paper we generalise the concept of marginal vector to trees. By generalising permuta-
tional convexity we obtain a sucient condition for the corresponding generalised marginal vector
to be a core element. Furthermore we rene permutational convexity and show that this renement
is still sucient for core-membership of the corresponding marginal vector. Besides that we show
that permutational convexity is equivalent to a restricted set of inequalities. In particular we reduce
the number of permutational convexity inequalities by a factor two. Finally we show that if a game
is permutationally convex with respect to an order, then it is permutationally convex with respect
to the last neighbour of this order as well.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we recall some basic concepts
of cooperative game theory. In Section 3 we prove that generalised permutational convexity is
sucient for a generalised marginal vector to be a core element. Section 4 is dedicated to a
renement of permutational convexity. Finally, in Section 5 we show that permutational convexity
is equivalent to a restricted set of inequalities and that if a game is permutationally convex with
respect to an order, then it is permutationally convex with respect to the last neighbour of this
order as well.
aCentER and Department of Econometrics and OR, Tilburg University, P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands.
bCorresponding author. Email: h.j.m.hamers@uvt.nl
12 Preliminaries
In this section we recall some concepts from cooperative game theory.
A TU-game (N;v) consists of a nite set of players N = f1;:::;jNjg and a map v : 2N ! R
that expresses the worth of each coalition. By convention we assume that v(;) = 0. The class of
TU-games with player set N will be denoted by TUN. The core of v 2 TUN is the set of ecient
payo vectors for which no coalition has an incentive to split o from the grand coalition, i.e.
C(v) = fx 2 RN :
P
i2N xi = v(N);
P
i2S xi  v(S) for all S  Ng. The core of a game can be
empty. An order on N is a bijection  : f1;:::;jNjg ! N. The set of all orders is given by (N).
Let  2 (N). The i-th neighbour i of  is obtained from  by interchanging the players at the
i-th and (i+1)-st position of . So i(j) = (j) for all j 2 f1;:::;jNjg, j 6= i;i+1, i(i) = (i+1)
and i(i + 1) = (i).
Let  2 (N). Dene [(i);] = f(j) : j  ig to be the set of all predecessors of (i), for all
i 2 f1;:::;jNjg. Additionally we dene, for notational simplicity, [(0);] = ;. Let v 2 TUN. The
marginal vector m(v) is given by m
(i)(v) = v([(i);])   v([(i   1);]) for each 1  i  jNj.
The game v 2 TUN is said to be permutationally convex with respect to  2 (N) if
v([(i);] [ S) + v([(k);])  v([(k);] [ S) + v([(i);]); (1)
for all 0  i < k  jNj   1 and S  Nn[(k);] with S 6= ;. If (N;v) is permutationally convex
with respect to , then  is also called permutationally convex for (N;v). The following theorem,
proved in [2], shows that if a TU-game is permutationally convex with respect to  2 (N), then
the corresponding marginal vector is a core element. We remark that the reverse of this theorem
is not true in general.
Theorem 1 ([2]). Let v 2 TUN. If  2 (N) is a permutationally convex order for (N;v), then
m(v) 2 C(v).
Let v 2 TUN. Then checking if an order  2 (N) is permutationally convex, requires the checking
of many inequalities. In fact, for each 0  i < k  jNj 1, there are precisely 2jNj k  1 choices of
S  Nn[(k);] with S 6= ;. Hence, for each 0  i < k  jNj   1, there are precisely 2jNj k   1





[2jNj k   1] =
jNj 2 X
i=0
[2jNj i   2   (jNj   i   1)]
= 2jNj+1   4   2(jNj   1)  
1
2








3 Generalised marginal vectors and generalised permutational con-
vexity
In this section we introduce a generalisation of marginal vectors. By introducing a generalisation
of permutational convexity we nd sucient conditions for the corresponding generalised marginal
vector to be a core element.
Let G = (N;E) be a directed rooted tree with the arcs pointed towards the root. Note
that each node (player) has precisely one follower, except for the root (player coinciding with
the root). The set of predecessors of j 2 N with respect to G is the set P(j) = fi 2 N :
there exists a directed path in G from i to jg. Note that j 2 P(j). For notational simplicity we
2dene P(0) = ;. Let D(j) = fi 2 N : (i;j) 2 Eg be the set of direct predecessors of j. Let
v 2 TUN and dene the payo vector hG(v) by hG
j (v) = v(P(j))  
P
i2D(j) v(P(i)) for all j 2 N.
Note that if G is a directed chain, then hG(v) corresponds to a marginal vector. Therefore we
call hG(v) the generalised marginal vector with respect to G. The following example illustrates the








Figure 1: The directed rooted tree G.
Example 1. Consider the directed rooted tree G = (N;E) of Figure 1 and let v 2 TUN. Then,
for instance, hG
1 (v) = v(f1g), hG
7 (v) = v(f1;2;3;4;5;6;7g)   v(f1;2;3;5g)   v(f4g)   v(f6g) and
hG
9 (v) = v(N)   v(f1;2;3;4;5;6;7g)   v(f8g). 3
A game v 2 TUN is called generalised permutationally convex with respect to G = (N;E) if for all








and for all j;k 2 N with (k;j) 2 E, I  P(k) with P(l)  I for all l 2 I, and S  NnP(k) with
j 2 S,
v(I [ S) + v(P(k))  v(P(k) [ S) + v(I): (3)
We remark that the term generalised permutational convex is slightly misleading, because if
G = (N;E) is a directed chain, then the concepts of permutational convexity and generalised
permutational convexity do not coincide. In fact, if G = (N;E) is a directed chain, then all in-
equalities of (2) disappear, but the inequalities of (3) boil down to a (proper) subset of the set
of permutational convexity inequalities. Hence, generalised permutational convexity is weaker for
directed chains than permutational convexity. In the following example we illustrate generalised
permutational convexity inequalities.
Example 2. Consider the tree from Figure 1. If v 2 TUN is generalised permutationally con-
vex with respect to G, then it follows from (2), taking M = f5;8g, that v(f1;2;3;5;8g) 
v(f1;2;3;5g) + v(f8g). Similarly, it follows from (3), with k = 7, j = 9, I = f1;2;3;5g and
S = f8;9g, that v(f1;2;3;5;8;9g) + v(f1;2;3;4;5;6;7g)  v(N) + v(f1;2;3;5g). 3
The following theorem is a generalisation of Theorem 1. It states that if a game is generalised
permutationally convex with respect to a directed rooted tree, then the corresponding generalised
marginal vector is a core element. In the proof of the theorem we make use of the following notations
and denitions.
For any W  N, let B(W) = fi 2 W : P(i)\W = figg be the set of players in W without any
predecessors in W, except themselves. Furthermore dene A(W) =
S
j2B(W) D(j). Let Q  N.a
aThe following sets we introduce all depend on Q. For the sake of notational convenience we omit this dependency
in notation.
3Then
E(Q) = fi 2 Q : i 62 P(j) for all j 2 Qnfigg
is the set of players in Q without any followers in Q. Furthermore, for each j 2 Q,
DP(j) = fi 2 Q \ P(j) : i 6= j;i 2 P(j) and there is no k 2 Q \ P(j);k 6= j; with i 2 P(k)g
is the set of players in Q directly preceding j. Finally, let l 2 Q and consider D(l). Then i 2 D(l)
can be such that i 2 Q, such that i 62 Q and P(i) \ Q = ;, or such that i 62 Q but P(i) \ Q 6= ;.
Therefore we partition D(l) into three subsets D1(l), D2(l) and D3(l) in the following way:
D1(l) = fi 2 D(l) : i 2 Qg;
D2(l) = fi 2 D(l) : P(i) \ Q = ;g;
D3(l) = fi 2 D(l) : i 62 Q but P(i) \ Q 6= ;g:
Now note that D1(l) = D(l)\DP(l), and that D3(l) = fi 2 D(l) : i 62 DP(l) but DP(l)\P(i) 6= ;g.
By denition of D3(l), for each i 2 D3(l) there is at least one j 2 P(i) with j 2 DP(l). Now dene
Ml(i) as the set containing all these players, i.e.
Ml(i) = DP(l) \ P(i):





We illustrate these sets in the following example.
Example 3. Let G = (N;E) be the directed tree depicted in Figure 1. Then B(f5;7;8g) = f5;8g
and A(f5;7;8g) = f1;2;3g. Let Q = f1;2;4;7;8g. Then E(Q) = f7;8g, DP(7) = f1;2;4g.
Furthermore, D(7) = f4;5;6g, D1(7) = D(7) \ f1;2;4g = f4g, D2(7) = f6g and D3(7) = f5g.
Finally, M7(5) = DP(7) \ P(5) = f1;2g and R(5) = f1;2g.
The following theorem shows that generalised permutational convexity is a sucient condition for
the generalised marginal vector to be a core element. In the proof of this theorem we make use of
several technical lemmas that are stated and proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 2. Let v 2 TUN and let G = (N;E) be a directed rooted tree with the arcs pointed
towards the root. If (N;v) is generalised permutationally convex with respect to G, then hG(v) 2
C(v).




 v(Q). Let Q  N. We show
P
i2Q hG
i (v)  v(Q) in a recursive manner. In fact, we obtain a






















4Now let A(Q) = fa1;:::;aqg. Note that for each ai 2 A(Q) there is a ji 2 Q with (ai;ji) 2 E.



























This last expression together with (5) shows that
P
i2Q hG
i (v)  v(Q).
Now we will rst concentrate on our sequence T1 ( T2 ( ::: ( Tm = Q. Our sequence starts
with T1 = E(Q). Note that E(Q)  Q. If E(Q) 6= Q, then QnE(Q) 6= ;. In particular there
is a k 2 QnE(Q) with k 2 DP(l) for some l 2 B(E(Q)). Note that it is even satised that
DP(l) \ E(Q) = ;. Now set T2 = T1 [ DP(l) and observe that T2  Q.
Now we will proceed this sequence in a similar way. To be more precise, each sequence element Tp
is constructed from Tp 1 by taking the union of Tp 1 with the set of direct predecessors of an element
in B(Tp 1). So if Tp 1 ( Q, then there is a k 2 QnTp 1 with k 2 DP(l) for some l 2 B(Tp 1).
Observe, by construction of our sequence, that Tp 1 \DP(l) = ;. Now set Tp = Tp 1 [DP(l), and
observe that both Tp 1 ( Tp and Tp  Q are trivially satised. Finally note that if l 2 N is such
that Tp = Tp 1 [ DP(l), then B(Tp) = (B(Tp 1)nflg) [ DP(l).
It remains to show that (4) is indeed satised for each 1  t  m. We will show this inequality




































The inequality follows from (2) with M = E(Q), where we note that P(i) \ P(j) = ; for all
i;j 2 E(Q), i 6= j. The last equality follows from the third assertion of Lemma 1 and the denition
of A(E(Q)).
For the induction hypothesis, assume that (4) is satised for all 1  t   t, with 1   t  m. If
 t = m, then we are done, so assume that  t < m.
























































The inequality is because of our induction hypothesis that (4) is satised for all t   t and the
denition of hG(v). In particular, (4) is satised for t = t 1. The last equality follows from Lemma
3. So showing that (4) holds for t = t boils down to showing that (6) exceeds v(Tt[
S
i2A(Tt) P(i)).














































i2D1(l) P(i). The rst equality follows by denition of
D1(l), D2(l) and D3(l). The second equality follows from the second assertion of Lemma 4.
We will now nd a bound for (7) by repeatedly applying (3). First write D2(l) = fd1;:::;drg.









satisfy the conditions accompanying (3). First observe that indeed (l;di) 2 E. Furthermore note





















P(di) = ;. First observe that P(dq) \ P(di) = ; for each 1  q  i   1 and that P(q) \ P(di) = ;
for each q 2 D3(l). It remains to check that  T \ P(di) = ;. Now note that P(q) \ P(di) = ;
for each q 2 D1(l), and that Tt \ P(di) = ;. Finally, note that P(q) \ P(l) = ; for each
q 2
S
p2A(Tt 1)nD(l) P(p). This implies, using di 2 P(l), that P(q) \ P(di) = ; for each q 2
S
p2A(Tt 1)nD(l) P(p). So  T \P(di) = ; and we conclude that (3) can be applied with k = di, j = l,










































































Now write D3(l) = fe1;:::;esg and let 1  i  s. Then observe that (ei;l) 2 E, R(ei)  P(ei)
and P(l) 2 R(ei) for each l 2 R(ei). So we can apply (3) with k = ei, j = l, I = R(ei) and

















 NnP(ei) and l 2 Tt 1. First note that l 2 Tt 1 implies





















\ P(ei) = ;. Now note that
P(eq) \ P(ei) = ; for each 1  q  i   1, and R(eq) \ P(ei) for each i + 1  q  s. It remains
to check that  T \ P(ei) = ;. Note that P(q) \ P(ei) for each q 2 D1(l) and that Tt \ P(ei) = ;.
Finally, note that P(q)\P(l) = ; for each q 2
S
p2A(Tt 1)nD(l) P(p). This implies, using ei 2 P(l),
that P(q) \ P(ei) = ; for each q 2
S
p2A(Tt 1)nD(l) P(p). So  T \ P(ei) = ; and we conclude that












































































The rst inequality is due to (9) and the second because of Lemma 6. The equality is due to Lemma
7. 2
Let G = (N;E) be a directed chain and let v 2 TUN. We noted before that in this case hG(v) cor-
responds to a marginal vector, and that the inequalities of (3) boil down to permutational convexity
inequalities. Hence, the following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 1. Let v 2 TUN. If  2 (N) is such that
v([(i);] [ S) + v([(k);])  v([(i);]) + v([(k);] [ S); (10)
for all 0  i < k  jNj   1 and S  Nn[(k);] with (k + 1) 2 S, then m(v) 2 C(v).
Let v 2 TUN and  2 (N). Observe that the condition of Corollary 1 is weaker than that of
Theorem 1 since in the condition of the corollary it is required that S  N is such that (k+1) 2 S.
In fact, for each 0  i < k  jNj   1, there are precisely 2jNj k 1 choices of S  Nn[(k);] such








[2jNj i 1   1] = 2jNj   2   (jNj   1) = 2jNj   jNj   1
inequalities. Note that this is exactly the number of non-empty coalitions that are not headsb of
. Furthermore observe that the number of inequalities in Corollary 1 is about half the number of
permutational convexity inequalities. As a nal remark we note that Corollary 1 can alternatively
be proved literally the same as the proof of Theorem 1 in [2].
4 A renement of permutational convexity
In this section we introduce a renement of permutational convexity. We show that the conditions
of this renement are still sucient for the corresponding marginal vector to be a core element.
Let  2 (N). Let S  N and dene h(S) = maxfj 2 f1;:::;jNjg : (j) 62 S;S 6 [(j);]g as
the highest ordered player outside S that precedes at least one player in S. We remark that h(S)
only exists if S is not a head of .
We will call v 2 TUN weak permutationally convex with respect to  if for each 0  i < k 
jNj   1 and each S  Nn[(k);] with (k + 1) 2 S at least one of the following two inequalities
is satised:
v(T) + v([(k);])  v([(k);] [ S) + v([(i);]) (11)
v(T) + v([(h(S));])  v([(h(S));] [ T) + v(T \ [(h(S));]); (12)
bA head of  is a coalition S  N such that S = f(1);:::;(k)g for some k 2 f1;:::;jNjg.
8where T = [(i);] [ S. Note that if S is connected, then the two inequalities coincide, since in
this case h(S) = k.
Let v 2 TUN and let  2 (N). Note that if the condition of Corollary 1 is satised for (N;v)
and , then (N;v) is weak permutationally convex with respect to . This observation also implies
that for weak permutational convexity there are precisely 2jNj   jNj   1 pairs of inequalities.
In the following example we illustrate weak permutational convexity.
Example 4. Let N = f1;2;3;4;5g, v 2 TUN and  2 (N) be given by (i) = i for each
i 2 f1;2;3;4;5g. Let i = 1, k = 2 and S = f3;5g. Then h(S) = 4. Hence, the corresponding
condition for weak permutational convexity is v(f1;3;5g) + v(f1;2g)  v(f1;2;3;5g) + v(f1g) or
v(f1;3;5g) + v(f1;2;3;4g)  v(N) + v(f1;3g). Note that if i = 1, k = 3 and S = f4;5g, then
h(S) = 3 = k. So both (11) and (12) boil down to v(f1;4;5g) + v(f1;2;3g)  v(N) + v(f1g).
The following theorem shows that weak permutational convexity is sucient for the corresponding
marginal vector to be a core element. We remark that this theorem implies Corollary 1 as well.
Theorem 3. Let  2 (N). If v 2 TUN is weak permutationally convex with respect to , then
m(v) 2 C(v).
Proof: Since marginal vectors are ecient by denition, we only need to show
P
i2W m
i (v)  v(W)
for each W  N. We will rst show that
P
i2W m
i (v)  v(W) for each W  N consisting of only
one component. Then we show the inequality for each W  N consisting of at least two components.
Let W  N consist of only one component. If (1) 2 W, then W is a head of , and trivially P
i2W m
i (v) = v(W). So assume that (1) 62 W. Let s 2 NnW be the highest ordered player in




i (v) = v([t;])   v([s;])  v(W):
The inequality is satised because both (11) and (12), with i = 0, k =  1(s) and S = W, coincide
with v(W) + v([s;])  v([t;]).
Now suppose that W consists of a  2 components. Let W1;:::;Wa be these components. We
assume that these components are ordered, i.e. if 1  i < k  a, then Wi  [j;] for each j 2 Wk.
For each 1  i  a, let ti be the highest ordered player in Wi, and let si be the highest ordered
player in NnW preceding all players in Wi. Dene s1 = 0 in case (1) 2 W1. We will now show by






i (v)  v([sp;] [
q [
l=p
Wl)   v([sp;]) (13)
for all 1  p < q  a. First we show the induction basis. So let 1  p < q  a be such that






i (v) = v([tp;])   v([sp;]) + v([tq;])   v([sq;])
 v([tp;] [ Wq)   v([sp;])
= v([sp;] [ Wp [ Wq)   v([sp;]):
The inequality is satised because both (11) and (12), with i =  1(tp), k =  1(sq) and S = Wq,
coincide with v([tp;] [ Wq) + v([sq;])  v([tq;]) + v([tp;]).
Now assume, as the induction hypothesis, that 1  j  a   1 is such that (13) is satised for
all 1  p < q  a with q  p  j. If j = a 1, then we are done, so assume that j < a 1. For the
9induction step, let 1  p < q  a with q   p = j + 1. From (11) and (12) with i =  1(tp),
k =  1(sp+1) and S =
Sq

















































The rst inequality is satised since, according to the induction hypothesis, (13) is satised for
each 1  p < q  a with q p  j. In particular, (13) is satised for the pair p+1;q. The second
inequality is due to (14).

































The rst inequality is satised since, according to the induction hypothesis, (13) is satised for
each 1  p < q  a with q p  j. In particular, (13) is satised for the pair p;q 1. The second
inequality is due to (15).
We conclude that (13) is satised for each 1  p < q  a. It follows from (13), with p = 1 and




i (v)  v([s1;] [
a [
l=1
Wl)   v([s1;]) = v([s1;] [ W)   v([s1;]): (16)
10If s1 = 0, then we are done. So assume that s1 6= 0. In order to show that
P
i2W m
i (v)  v(W), we






























i (v) = v([t1;])   v([s1;])  v(W1):
The inequality is satised because both (11) and (12), with i = 0, k =  1(s1) and S = W1,
coincide with v(W1) + v([s1;])  v([t1;]).
Now assume, as the induction hypothesis, that 2  j  a is such that (17) is satised for all
1  r  j. If j = a, then we are done, so assume that j < a. For the induction step, let r = j +1.
From (11) and (12), with i = 0, k =  1(s1) and S =
Sr
l=1 Wl, we conclude that at least one of





















i (v)  v([s1;] [
r [
l=1




The rst inequality follows from it follows from (13) with p = 1 and q = r that and the second
from (18).





















The rst inequality is due to our induction hypothesis that (17) is satised for all r  j. In partic-
ular, (17) is satised for r = r   1. The second inequality holds because of (19). 2
The following example is meant to illustrate that weak permutational convexity is not a neces-
sary condition for the corresponding marginal vector to be a core element.
11Example 5. Consider v 2 TUN with N = f1;2;3;4g, v(S) = 0 if S 2 2Nnff1;2g;f2;4g;
f1;2;3g;Ng and v(f1;2g) = v(f2;4g) = v(f1;2;3g) = v(N) = 1. Let  2 (N) be given by
(i) = i for each i 2 f1;2;3;4g. Observe that (N;v) is not weak permutationally convex with
respect to , since the corresponding condition is not satised for i = 0, k = 1 and S = f2;4g.
However, m(v) = (0;1;0;0) 2 C(v). 3
5 A restricted set of inequalities
In this section we obtain a reduced set of inequalities that is equivalent to permutational convex-
ity. Furthermore we give conditions such that if a game is permutationally convex with respect
to one order, then it is permutationally convex with respect to another order as well. As a corol-
lary we obtain that if a game is permutationally convex with respect to an order, then it is also
permutationally convex with respect to the last neighbour of this order.
The following proposition shows that permutational convexity is equivalent to a restricted set
of inequalities.
Proposition 1. Let v 2 TUN. Then (N;v) is permutationally convex with respect to  2 (N)
if and only if (1) is satised for all 0  i < k  jNj   1 with i + 1 = k and S  Nn[(k);] with
S 6= ;.
Proof: The "only if" part follows directly from the denition of permutational convexity. Therefore
we only show the "if" part. Assume that (1) is satised for all 0  i < k  jNj 1 with i+1 = k and
S  Nn[(k);] with S 6= ;. It remains to show that (1) is also satised for all 0  i < k  jNj 1
with i + 1 6= k and S  Nn[(k);] with S 6= ;. We use backwards induction on i.
For the induction basis let i = jNj   3, k = jNj   1 and S  Nn[(jNj   1);] with S 6= ;.
Hence, S = f(jNj)g. We know from our initial assumption that (1) is satised for  i = jNj   2,
 k = jNj   1 and S = f(jNj)g. Hence,
v([(jNj   2);] [ f(jNj)g) + v([(jNj   1);])  v(N) + v([(jNj   2);]): (20)
Furthermore, our initial assumption implies that (1) is satised for ^ i = jNj   3, ^ k = jNj   2 and
S = f(jNj)g. Therefore,
v([(jNj 3);][f(jNj)g)+v([(jNj 2);])  v([(jNj 2);][f(jNj)g)+v([(jNj 3);]): (21)
Adding (20) and (21) yields
v([(jNj   3);] [ f(jNj)g) + v([(jNj   1);])  v(N) + v([(jNj   3);]);
which is precisely (1) with i = jNj   3, k = jNj   1 and S = f(jNj)g.
For the induction hypothesis we assume that for some 1  i  jNj 3 we have shown that (1)
is satised for all 0  i < k  jNj   1 with i  i, i + 1 < k, and S  Nn[(k);] with S 6= ;.
For the induction step, let 0  i < k  jNj   1 be such that i = i   1, i + 1 < k and
S  Nn[(k);] with S 6= ;. From our induction hypothesis it follows that (1) is satised for
 i = i,  k = k and S. Hence,
v([(i);] [ S) + v([(k);])  v([(k);] [ S) + v([(i);]): (22)
We also know from our initial assumption that (1) is satised for  i = i,  k = i and S, since i+1 =  k.
This yields
v([(i);] [ S) + v([(i);])  v([(i);] [ S) + v([(i);]): (23)
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v([(i);] [ S) + v([(k);])  v([(k);] [ S) + v([(i);]);
which is precisely the inequality we needed to show. 2
Let v 2 TUN and  2 (N). According to Proposition 1, permutational convexity of  requires
the checking of precisely 2jNj k   1 inequalities for each pair 0  i < k  jNj   1 with i + 1 = k.
This implies that in total
jNj 1 X
k=1
[2jNj k   1] = 2jNj   2   (jNj   1) = 2jNj   jNj   1
inequalities need to be checked. In particular, Proposition 1 reduces the number of permutational
convexity inequalities by a factor two.
The following proposition presents inequalities such that if a game is permutationally convex
with respect to  2 (N), then it is permutationally convex with respect to a neighbour of  as
well.
Proposition 2. Let v 2 TUN. Let  2 (N) be a permutationally convex order for (N;v) and
let 1  l  jNj   1. If
v([l(i);l] [ S) + v([l(k);l])  v([l(k);l] [ S) + v([l(i);l]); (24)
for i = l   1, k = l and all S  Nn[l(l + 1);l] with S 6= ;, and for i = l, k = l + 1 and all
S  Nn[l(l + 1);l] with S 6= ;, then l is permutationally convex for (N;v).
Proof: According to Proposition 1 showing that l is permutationally convex boils down to show-
ing (24) for all 0  i < k  jNj 1 with i+1 = k and S  Nn[l(k);l] with S 6= ;. We distinguish
between three cases.
Case 1: i  l   2 or i  l + 1.
In this case [l(i);l] = [(i);] and [l(k);l] = [(k);]. Let S  Nn[l(k);l] = Nn[(k);]
with S 6= ;. Since  is permutationally convex for (N;v) we conclude that (1) is satised for i,
k = i + 1 and S. Observe that (1) coincides with (24).
Case 2: i = l   1.
In this case k = i+1 = l. We need to show that (24) holds for all S  Nn[l(k);l] with S 6= ;.
First note that if l(k + 1) 62 S, then S  Nn[l(k + 1);l] = Nn[l(l + 1);l]. In this case (24) is
satised by assumption. So now suppose that l(k + 1) 2 S. Let T = Snfl(k + 1)g. Since  is
permutationally convex for (N;v) it follows that (1) holds with  i = i,  k = k and  S = f(k + 1)g,
i.e.,
v([(i);] [ f(k + 1)g) + v([(k);])  v([(k);] [ f(k + 1)g) + v([(i);]);
which is equivalent to
v([(i);] [ f(k + 1)g) + v([(k);])  v([(k + 1);]) + v([(i);]): (25)
Furthermore, (1) is satised for ^ i = i + 1 = k, ^ k = k + 1 and ^ S = T since  is permutationally
convex by assumption. This implies
v([(k);] [ T) + v([(k + 1);])  v([(k + 1);] [ T) + v([(k);]): (26)
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v([(k);] [ T) + v([(i);] [ f(k + 1)g)  v([(k + 1);] [ T) + v([(i);]): (27)
Observe that [(k);] [ T = [l(i);l] [ S, [(i);] [ f(k + 1)g = [l(k);l], [(k + 1);] [ T =
[l(k);l] [ S and [(i);] = [l(i);l]. This shows that (27) coincides with (24).
Case 3: i = l.
In this case k = i + 1 = l + 1. Let S  Nn[l(l + 1);l] with S 6= ;. Now (24) is satised by
assumption. 2
Proposition 2 easily constitutes the following corollary. This corollary shows that if one order is
permutationally convex, then its last neighbour is permutationally convex as well. Hence, for each
game an even number of orders is permutationally convex.
Corollary 2. Let v 2 TUN. If  2 (N) is permutationally convex for (N;v), then jNj 1 is
permutationally convex for (N;v) as well.
Proof: According to Proposition 2 it is sucient to show that
v([jNj 1(i);jNj 1][S)+v([jNj 1(k);jNj 1])  v([jNj 1(k);jNj 1][S)+v([jNj 1(i);jNj 1])
is satised for i = jNj   2, k = jNj   1 and all S  Nn[jNj 1(jNj);jNj 1] with S 6= ;, and
for i = jNj   1, k = jNj and all S  Nn[jNj 1(jNj);jNj 1] with S 6= ;. However, if S 
Nn[jNj 1(jNj);jNj 1], then S = ;. 2
Appendix
In this section we state and prove the technical lemmas that are needed for the proof of Theorem
2.
Lemma 1. It holds that B(E(Q)) = E(Q), A(E(Q)) =
S
q2E(Q) D(q) and E(Q)[
S
i2A(E(Q)) P(i) = S
q2E(Q) P(q).
Proof: We rst show B(E(Q)) = E(Q). By denition, B(E(Q))  E(Q). Now let i 2 E(Q).
Then i 62 P(q) for each q 2 Qnfig. Hence, P(i) \ Q = fig for each i 2 E(Q), and therefore also
P(i) \ E(Q) = fig for each i 2 E(Q). So i 2 B(E(Q)) and we conclude that E(Q)  B(E(Q)).




q2E(Q) D(q). The rst equality is satised by
denition of A(E(Q)), and the second because B(E(Q)) = E(Q).


















The rst equality is satised because A(E(Q)) =
S
q2E(Q) D(q). 2
Lemma 2. It holds that A(Tt 1) [
S























= A(Tt) [ D(l):
The rst equality holds by denition of A(Tt 1). For the second equality we have used that
l 2 B(Tt 1). The third equality follows from (B(Tt 1)nflg) [ DP(l) = B(Tt). The last equality
follows again by denition of A(Tt). 2











Proof: Follows directly from Lemma 2. 2
























































The rst equality is satised because l 2 B(Tt 1). Hence, D(l)  A(Tt 1) and A(Tt 1) =
(A(Tt 1)nD(l)) [ D(l). The second equality follows by denition of D1(l), D2(l) and D3(l). 2
Lemma 5. The sets Ml(q), q 2 D3(l)g, form a partition of DP(l)nD1(l).
Proof: Because P(i) \ P(j) = ; for each i;j 2 D3(l), i 6= j, it follows that Ml(i) \ Ml(j) = ; for
each i;j 2 D3(l), i 6= j.
Now let q 2 D3(l) and i 2 Ml(q). Then i 2 DP(l). Since q 62 D1(l) and i 2 P(q), it follows
that i 62 D1(l). So i 2 DP(l)nD1(l). We conclude that Ml(q)  DP(l)nD1(l) for each q 2 D3(l).
It remains to show that
S
q2D3(l) Ml(q) = DP(l)nD1(l). Since Ml(q)  DP(l)nD1(l) for each
q 2 D3(l), it is sucient to show that DP(l)nD1(l) 
S
q2D3(l) Ml(q). Let i 2 DP(l)nD1(l). Then
there is a q 2 D3(l) with i 2 P(q). Hence, i 2 DP(l) \ P(q) = Ml(q). 2




q2D3(l) v(R(q))  0.









Now let q 2 D3(l) and i;k 2 Ml(j), i 6= k. Since i;k 2 DP(l) \ P(q), it follows that i;k 2 DP(l).
It follows that P(i) \ P(k) = ;. We conclude that for each j 2 D3(l) and each i;k 2 Ml(j), i 6= k,



















Lemma 7. It holds that  T [
S
q2D3(l) R(q) = Tt [
S
i2A(Tt) P(i).




i2D1(l) P(i) and because Tt = Tt 1 [DP(l)













First note that it follows from Lemma 2, and the observation that A(Tt)\D(l) = ;, that A(Tt) =
(A(Tt 1)nD1(l))[
S

















We will show this equality by rst rewriting
S

















The rst equality is satised by denition of R(i). The last equality is satised because fMl(q) :
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